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I. Introduction: The Broadest and Most Prominent Standard in 
Investment Treaties 
In 2007, the Tribunal in PSEG v. Turkey highlighted that the standard of fair and 
equitable treatment (FET) had become the prominent standard invoked before 
investment arbitral tribunals.1 Ever since, the pace of this movement of FET to the 
centre of the investment dispute agenda has remained steady and has intensified. An 
empirical study to quantify the percentage volume of FET arguments in the pleadings 
before the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
tribunals would certainly point to a role of FET discourse that would not have been 
anticipated a decade ago.2 
While these developments may be surprising, at first sight, it is not difficult to 
understand the reasons for this evolution. Firstly, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
only set forth limited number of (often seven) substantive absolute standards. Secondly, 
the FET rule is certainly the broadest of all of them, susceptible to cover a much wider 
range of activities than other rules. Accordingly, investment lawyers representing 
claimants naturally seek to tailor their cases and their arguments so that they will be 
subsumed under the FET standard. 
To recognize this setting does not mean to be critical of the existence of or nature of 
the standard, or of its role in practice. The wide range of measures by the host state with 
inappropriately negative effects on the investor must be taken into account in this 
context. Thus, FET may be considered to be at the heart of investment arbitration 
because of the vastness of factual situations pertaining to host state actions affecting the 
rights and interests of the investor. Noble v. Romania has reminded us, generally, of the 
scope of the standard.3 Even if a host state’s measure does not fall under any particular 
 
1. See PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, ¶ 238 (Jan. 19, 
2007), http://italaw.com/documents/PSEGGlobal-Turkey-Award.pdf [hereinafter PSEG Award]. 
See also Saluka Invs. BV v. Czech, Partial Award, ¶ 284 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006) [hereinafter Saluka 
Partial Award], 15 ICSID Rep. 274 (2010). 
2. The first tribunal to apply the standard was Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award (Nov. 13, 2000) [hereinafter Maffezini Award], 5 ICSID Rep. 
419 (2002). 
3. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 182 (Sep. 12 2005), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0565.pdf. For factual settings which 
do not clearly fall into one of the frequently quoted sub-categories, see, e.g., Paushok v. Gov't of 
Mong., Award on Jurisdiction and Liab. (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. April 28, 2011), 
http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf [hereinafter Paushok Award] (concerning an 
owner of gold deprived of rights by untimely selling of gold by government); Total S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liab. (Dec. 27, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/documents/TotalvArgentina_DecisionOnLiabilty.pdf [hereinafter Total Decision] 
(concerning the failure by government to readjust equilibrium of tariffs at the end of a state of 
emergency); and Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award (Oct. 
20, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0026.pdf [hereinafter Alpha 
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expression of FET, this does not necessarily mean that the measure is in conformity with 
the standard. In other words, the standard is not amenable to all-embracing definitions 
that will cover all conceivable cases. 
Conceptually, it is important to note that the duty to accord fair and equitable 
treatment extends to all subject matters. It is not the importance of an economic sector to 
the host state or to the investor, but the treatment of the investor by the host state which 
will be examined under FET clause.4 
To decide whether or not the standard has justly found its current place in investment 
treaties, and in investment arbitration, is a task that is best undertaken by way of 
judging the results of arbitral practice in specific cases.  The question to be asked is:  “In 
view of the facts of the case, will it be appropriate to conclude that claimant was treated 
in fair and equitable manner?” Anecdotal experience in the classroom suggests that the 
answers in most cases are more uniform than may be anticipated. 
As a matter of legal discourse, the key issue has been whether the understanding of 
the standard’s nature and function and its application has matured enough to make it 
manageable on the operational level so that it is justified to speak of a legally distinct, 
manageable rule available for practical purposes of investment arbitration. The following 
observations will seek to address this question. 
II. The Nature and Function of the FET Rule 
In 2007, the Tribunal in PSEG v. Turkey properly characterized the nature and role of 
the FET rule as follows: 
The standard of fair and equitable treatment has acquired prominence 
in investment arbitration as a consequence of the fact that other 
standards traditionally provided by international law might not in the 
circumstances of each case be entirely appropriate. This is particularly 
the case when the facts of the dispute do not clearly support the claim 
for direct expropriation, but when there are notwithstanding events 
that need to be assessed under a different standard to provide redress 
in the event that the rights of the investor have been breached. 
Because the role of fair and equitable treatment changes from case to 
case, it is sometimes not as precise as would be desirable. Yet, it clearly 
does allow for justice to be done in the absence of the more traditional 
breaches of international law standards. This role has resulted in the 
 
Award] (concerning government stop payments of contractual debtor and for failure of debtor to 
fulfill its obligations). 
4. See, e.g., Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3467, 
Final Award, ¶ 191 (July 1, 2004), http://italaw.com/documents/Oxy-EcuadorFinalAward_001.pdf 
[hereinafter Occidental Final Award] (discussing application of value-added tax, not tax as such); 
and PSEG Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 246-247 (finding that the style of negotiations may violate the 
FET standard). 
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concept of fair and equitable treatment acquiring a standing on its own, 
separate and distinct from that of other standards, albeit many times 
closely related to them, and thus ensuring that the protection granted 
to the investment is fully safeguarded.5 
In 2012, Swisslion v. Macedonia subscribed “to the view expressed by certain 
tribunals that the [FET] standard basically ensures that the foreign investor is not 
unjustly treated, with due regard to all surrounding circumstances, and that it is a 
means to guarantee justice to foreign investors.” 6 
In a broad sense, acceptance of the standard is a response to the danger of the 
“obsolescent bargain” which may threaten an investor who was welcomed by the host 
state before his investment, who sunk its money into the project, but who later on finds 
itself subject to the upper hand of the host state. Desert Line v. Yemen addressed this 
basic issue inherent in the nature of long-term investment in the light of the 
circumstances of the case before it as follows: 
It would offend the most elementary notions of good faith, and insulting to the 
Head of State, to imagine that he offered his assurances and acceptance [of the 
investment] with his fingers crossed, as it were, making a reservation to the effect 
“that we welcome you, but will not extend to you the benefits of our BIT with your 
country.” 7  
Similar to clauses in classical civil codes in Continental Europe, the FET standard 
serves to address such acts and occurrences which do not fall into the net of specific 
standards but nevertheless are deemed to be inconsistent with the object and purpose of 
the BIT, i.e., to protect and promote foreign investment and thereby to contribute to the 
economic goals of the host state, as often recognized in BIT preambles. 
The acceptance of the standard is directly linked to the fundamental moral and legal 
grounding of the notion of fairness, anchored in a universally accepted sense of justice, 
but also in classic rules of customary law governing the protection of foreign nationals 
and companies. Elihu Root stated the position in a prominent article a century ago: 
There is a standard of justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of such general 
acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a part of the international law of the 
world. The condition upon which any country is entitled to measure the justice due 
 
5. PSEG Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 238-239. 
6. Swisslion DOO Skopje v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Maced., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/16, 
Award, ¶ 273 (July 6, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1080.pdf. 
See also PSEG Award, supra note 1. 
7. Desert Line Projects LLC v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, ¶ 119 
(Feb. 6, 2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0248_0.pdf. See 
also Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award ¶ 254 (Sept. 5, 
2008), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf [hereinafter Cont’l 
Cas. Award] (adopting this view). FET “is aimed at assuring that the normal law-abiding 
conduct of the business activity by the foreign investor is not hampered without good reasons 
by the host government and other authorities.” Cont’l Cas. Award, ¶ 254. 
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from it to an alien by the justice which it accords to its own citizens is that its 
system of law and administration shall conform to this general standard. If any 
country’s system of law and administration does not conform to that standard, 
although the people of the country may be content or compelled to live under it, no 
other country can be compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory measure of 
treatment to its citizens.8 
Often is has been assumed that the traditional capital-exporting countries in general 
have stood for a wide version of the standard, whereas southern countries preferred a 
narrow one.  However, from today’s perspective, this generalisation is flawed. What is 
well-known is that the United States has turned to a narrow approach. What has 
received less attention is that China, with the most BITs worldwide except for Germany, 
has adopted the widest possible approach, that is, an unqualified version of FET. 
Essentially, the United States has become concerned about the need to defend cases 
concerning inward investments as respondent, while China has focused on its role as 
outward investor and the need for fair treatment of Chinese investments abroad. In other 
words, the FET standard does not, at least not today, pitch northern and southern states 
against each other. The landscape of investment arbitration has been transformed in the 
past decade, and the role of FET with it. 
Is it fair to expect fair and equitable treatment by a host state? To rephrase the 
question is helpful: “Should a state inviting foreign investment claim to have the right of 
unfair and inequitable treatment of the foreign investors with their capital and 
technology to be employed in the foreign host state?” This, of course, is a rhetorical 
question. 
III. Methodology: Applying the Rule 
As regards the methodology of applying the standard, the effort to deduce a conclusion 
directly from the standard, as such, has not appeared to be attractive, for understandable 
reasons.9 While the facts of a case may be subject to a general sense of justice, tribunals 
will properly seek to articulate their reasoning with more specificity. Efforts to employ 
abstract reasoning with the help of broad ancillary definitions of FET (such as those 
 
8. Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 521-22 
(1910). 
9. But see The Rompetrol Group NV v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award, ¶¶ 195-197 (May 6, 
2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1408.pdf. The Tribunal 
seems to agree with the list approach but then proceeds to state that it will “follow the ordinary 
meaning of the words used, in their context, and in the light of the object and purpose of the BIT.” 
Id. ¶ 197. The Tribunal adds that “it will take into particular account the two general elements 
that other tribunals have found come into play in connection with claims to ‘fair and equitable 
treatment,’ namely the way in which the foreign investor or the foreign investment have been 
treated by the organs of the host State (whether in a regulatory context or otherwise), measured 
against the expectations legitimately entertained by the foreign investor in making its 
investment.” Id.  
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found in dictionaries) may be of some argumentative value as starting points for the 
more concrete discussion of the case. 
The preferred method has been to unfold the standard on the basis of casuistic sub-
groups which will be seen as typical emanations of the standards. More and more 
tribunals have turned to such sub-groups and found them useful for the articulation of 
and application of the standard. A tribunal may focus only on one criterion relevant to its 
case. An increasing number of tribunals, however, have assumed the broader task to set 
forth a list of components which, in their entirety, may compose the full reach of the FET 
standard. 
For the first time, the “list approach” was employed in Tecmed v. Mexico (Tecmed): 
The Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in light of the 
good faith principle established by international law, requires the Contracting 
Parties to provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the 
basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the 
investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent 
manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the 
foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations 
that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and 
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply 
with such regulations . . . . The foreign investor also expects the host State to act 
consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any preexisting decisions or permits 
issued by the State that were relied upon by the investor to assume its 
commitments as well as to plan and launch its commercial and business activities. 
The investor also expects the State to use the legal instruments that govern the 
actions of the investor or the investment in conformity with the function usually 
assigned to such instruments, and not to deprive the investor of its investment 
without the required compensation. 10 
For the assessment of the present state of the law, it bears emphasis that the Tecmed 
Award has been, and remains, the award most often cited in arbitral jurisprudence, 
obviously with more persuasive power than other attempts to approach the standard. As 
we shall see, not every single word of the Tecmed Award has to be accepted uncritically. 
Other tribunals have set forth lists similar in nature, albeit not identical.11 A stock-
taking today will record at the outset that this rise of the standard has not come about 
 
10. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter Tecmed Award], 10 ICSID Rep. 134 
(2006). 
11. See Deutsche Bank AG v. Dem. Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, Award, 
¶ 420 (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1272.pdf 
(citing Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (April 
30, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967 (2004)); Spyridon Roussalis v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶ 
314 (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0723.pdf 
[hereinafter Spyridon Roussalis Award] (citing Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶ 605 (July 29, 2008), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0728.pdf [hereinafter Rumeli Award]); Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. The 
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without criticism.12 Neither has this rise been straightforward as regards the views and 
practice of states, with the consequence of the introduction of a number of variations of 
the standards, sometimes seriously or drastically restricting its scope.  
The values inherent and embodied in the rule notwithstanding, the standard may be 
seen from a critical perspective in view of the subjectivity to which its application may 
subject the host state. Here, we get to the centre of the debate surrounding FET. Two 
separate issues must be distinguished in this context. Firstly as we all know, the current 
system of investment arbitration has not been designed in order to promote uniformity or 
consistency of either rule-making or rule-interpretation,13 with the sprawling 
consequences which we have seen, producing diversity of approaches to most rules, 
including FET. The second issue of the FET standard which, it is said, renders its 
application unpredictable and unmanageable, pertains to the argument of its inherently 
subjective nature.    
No one will doubt the inherent breadth of the terms fair and equitable which are in 
practice understood together as one concept. At the same time, it will also be recognized 
that arbitral jurisprudence has succeeded enough to unfold the concept in a casuistic 
manner leading to groups and clusters of subgroups with more defined contours. My own 
count of these, leads me to these clusters, with some overlap: good faith in the conduct of 
a party, consistency of conduct, transparency of rules, recognition of the scope and 
purpose of laws, due process, prohibition of harassment, a reasonable degree of stability 
and predictability of the legal system, and, in particular, recognition of the legitimate 
expectation on the part of the investor to which I will turn later. I consider that 
arbitrariness and discrimination also fall under the heading of FET, even though 
separate, specific rules in investment treaties may (or may not) address these concepts. 
 
Republic of Leb., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, ¶¶ 151-159 (June 7 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1013.pdf [hereinafter Toto Award] 
(citing and describing earlier relevant cases); Bosh Int’l, Inc. v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11, 
Award, ¶ 212 (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1118.pdf (citing Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Liab., ¶ 284 (Jan. 14, 2010), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0454.pdf); Total Decision, supra note 3, ¶ 110; Oostergetel v. Slovk., UNCITRAL Ad 
Hoc Arb., Final Award, ¶ 222 (Apr. 23, 2012), 
http://old.italaw.com/documents/OostergetelvSlovakRepublic.pdf [hereinafter Oostergetel Final 
Award] (citing cases for legitimate expectations); and Paushok Award, supra note 3, ¶ 253 
(following the Rumeli Award). 
12. See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Decision on 
Annulment, ¶ 67 (Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0546.pdf [hereinafter MTD Award] (proposing a standard for legitimate 
expectations which would, in effect, come close to abandoning this component). The Committee’s 
reasoning is circular in nature.  
13. See R. Dolzer, Perspectives for Investment Arbitration: Consistency as a Policy Goal, 3 TRANSNAT’L 
DISP. MGMT. J. (2012), www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1823 
(available by subscription or purchase). 
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The point here is to emphasize the evolution of the jurisprudence in general of the 
FET standard by way of developing operationally distinct subcategories of conduct meant 
to detail the meaning of the standard. These sub-categories, if rightly understood, do not 
depend on subjective views of the investor, but on the objective conduct of the host state.   
Here, it also needs to be recalled that the degree of protection granted cannot be 
determined from the individual vantage point of the investor above; instead the laws, 
regulations and the conduct of the host state, expressed in objectively demonstrable 
terms, must serve as the appropriate framework for legitimate expectations. 
Otherwise, the unilateral viewpoint of the investor would determine the application of 
the standard.  As regards the Tecmed approach, I consider that its phrase “basic 
expectations” must be understood as the sum of the objective elements discussed in the 
subsequent passage.14 
 IV.The Current Architecture of the FET Standard 
The multifaceted jurisprudence on FET shall now be reconstrued and reduced to its 
recurrent individual components as they appear in arbitral jurisprudence. As pointed out 
earlier, these components do not cover the entire scope of the rule’s application. Also, it 
will be recognized that the components may overlap in their restrictive reach. It is 
generally recognized today that legitimate expectations arise out of the objective conduct 
of the host state and not out of subjective postulates of the investor. No BIT standard 
exists which derives its content from the unilateral viewpoint of one side, be it the 
investor or the host state. A point that remains to be decided concerns the manner in 
which the investor must show that the state’s objective conduct gave rise to expectations 
on the part of the investor. 
A. Good Faith 
As is well known, the principle of good faith is recognized as a general principle of law, 
and thus a source of international law under Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice.15 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes 
the role of the principle specifically for the purpose of interpreting a treaty.16 
As to the significance of good faith in investment law, it has been said that the 
principle “permeates the whole approach”17 to investor protection and, more particularly, 
 
14. Tecmed Award, supra note 10, ¶ 154. 
15. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, para. 1, available at, http://www.icj-
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0. 
16. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/CTCTreaties.aspx?id=23&subid=A&lang=en. 
17. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 299 (Sept. 28, 
2007), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0770.pdf. 
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that is “at the heart of the concept of fair and equitable treatment,”18 as a “guiding 
beacon . . . to the obligation[s].”19 In a similar way, Waste Management v Mexico, for 
instance, addressing Article 1105 of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), has considered the obligation to act in good faith as a “basic obligation” under 
the FET standard.20 
One obvious application of the notion of good faith is the duty to act for cause, and not 
for purely arbitrary reasons of domestic politics.21 Good faith may overlap with the rule 
on arbitrary treatment and often with other components such as consistency. In many 
cases, good faith will be subsumed, and only the other components may be discussed. 
B. Legitimate Expectations: The State of the Law 
The inherent legal affinity between fair and equitable treatment, good faith, and the 
protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations has rightly been recognized and 
highlighted by investment tribunals. The protection of legitimate expectations by the 
FET standard will today properly be considered as the central pillar in the 
understanding and application of the FET standard. In 2012, the Tribunal in Electrabel 
v. Hungary22 highlighted that “the most important function” of the FET standard is the 
protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations. 
The rationale and justification for the recognition of legitimate expectations seems 
obvious. The investor makes its calculations and decisions in the light of the law of the 
host state as it is made available to it by the host state, and the investor’s assumptions 
about the return for its investment will depend upon the stability and predictability of 
those laws. Had the legal order been different, this decision to invest might have been 
different. 
From the viewpoint of the host country, it appears not unreasonable to accept the 
benchmark of the legal order which it has adopted for itself at the time of the investment. 
This way, the host state’s exercise of its sovereign rights is respected, albeit focused on 
the time it admitted the investment. 
 
18. Id. ¶ 298. 
19. Id. ¶ 297. 
20. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, ¶ 138 (April 
30, 2004) [hereinafter Waste Mgmt. Award], 43 I.L.M. 967 (2004). 
21. Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award, ¶ 233 (Aug. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Eureko 
Partial Award], 12 ICSID Rep. 335 (2007). 
22. Electrabel S.A. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law 
and Liab., ¶ 7.75 (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1071clean.pdf [hereinafter Electrabel Decision]. 
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1. The Rise of Legitimate Expectations: Consolidated Jurisprudence 
In a series of decisions, arbitral jurisprudence has unfolded the essence of fair and 
equitable treatment and has identified the significance of legitimate expectations for 
understanding the standard.23 The main points in this evolution over the past decade will 
be traced below in a brief consideration of the relevant decisions. The key issue has been 
to identify the parameters of those types of conduct, on the part of the host state, which 
determine the boundaries of the sphere of legally relevant expectations. 
- In 2003, Tecmed required that the host state respect the basic expectations of the 
investor at the time of the investment and act without revoking any decisions, in an 
arbitrary manner upon which the investor had relied in planning its investment.24 
- A year later, in 2004, Occidental v. Ecuador confirmed that the unilateral change of 
the legal and contractual framework existing at the item of the original investment 
would frustrate the investor’s legitimate expectations and thereby violate the FET 
standard.25 
- In 2006, the Tribunal in LG&E v. Argentina stated that the understanding of FET 
involves consideration of the investor’s expectations when making its investment in 
reliance on the protections to be granted by the host state.26 
- Also in 2006, Thunderbird v. Mexico ruled that an investor may rely on the host 
state’s conduct which creates justifiable expectations: 
[T]he concept of “legitimate expectations” relates . . . to a situation where a 
Contracting Party’s conduct creates reasonable and justifiable expectations on the 
part of an investor (or an investment) to act in reliance on such conduct, such that 
a failure by the Party to honor those expectations could cause the investor (or the 
investment) to suffer damages.27 
- In National Grid v. Argentina, the Tribunal ruled that the FET standards protect the 
investor’s expectations, which were “reasonable and legitimate in the context in which 
 
23. The terminology is not uniform. Some tribunals speak of “reasonable” or “justified” 
expectations. However, “legitimate” expectations is preferred here as it provides for a more 
contextual argumentative basis. The use of the term “basic expectations” in the Tecmed 
decision raises the issue whether the subjective views of the investors by themselves should be 
considered as the yardstick for legitimate expectations. 
24. Tecmed Award., supra note 10, ¶ 159. 
25. Occidental Final Award, supra note 4, ¶¶ 184-192. 
26. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liab., ¶ 127 
(Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter LG&E Decision], http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0460.pdf. 
27. Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award, ¶ 147 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. 
Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0431.pdf [hereinafter 
Thunderbird Award]. 
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the investment was made.”28 Here, the Tribunal pointed to the economic situation to the 
regulatory legal framework of the host state and to the inducement of the investment by 
the host state.29 
- In 2010, the Tribunal in Suez v Argentina summarized the state of the law and 
highlighted the investor’s legitimate reliance on the host state’s laws and regulations: 
In examining the various cases that have justifiably considered the legitimate 
expectations of investors and the extent to which the host government has 
frustrated them, this Tribunal finds that an important element of such cases has 
not been sufficiently emphasized: that investors, deriving their expectations from 
the laws and regulations adopted by the host country, acted in reliance upon those 
laws and regulations and changed their economic position as a result. Thus, it was 
not the investor’s legitimate expectations alone that led tribunals to find a denial of 
fair and equitable treatment. It was the existence of such expectations created by 
host country laws, coupled with the act of investing their capital in reliance on 
them, and a subsequent, sudden change in those laws that led to a determination 
that the host country had not treated the investors fair and equitably.30 
- In a further step, in Lemire v. Ukraine, the Tribunal, addressing an investment in 
the radio section, ruled to include, in the protection granted by the FET standard, “the 
common level of legal comfort which any protected foreign investor in the radio sector 
could expect.”31 
- The new dominance of the role of legitimate expectations for the understanding of 
fair and equitable treatment was confirmed in 2011 in El Paso v. Argentina. “There is an 
overwhelming trend to consider the touchstone of fair and equitable treatment to be 
found in the legitimate and reasonable expectations of the Parties, which derive from the 
obligation of good faith.”32   
The situation so described was not entirely new. As early as 2006, Saluka v. Czech 
Republic (Saluka) had observed the same position.33   
 
28. National Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic, Award, ¶ 175 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 3, 2008), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0555.pdf [hereinafter National Grid 
Award].  
29. Id. ¶¶ 176-180. 
30. Suez v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liab., ¶ 226 (July 30, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0826.pdf. 
31. Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Award, ¶ 70 (Mar. 28, 2001), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0454.pdf [hereinafter Lemire Award]. 
32. El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB 03/15, Award, ¶ 348 (Oct. 27, 
2011), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0270.pdf [hereinafter El Paso 
Award]. 
33. Saluka Partial Award, supra note 1, ¶ 302. 
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2. A Summary of the Current State of the Law 
In the light of the arbitral jurisprudence, the details of the current state of the law 
will be summarized by way of five components, the existence of which determines 
whether the FET standard will protect the expectations of the investor in a given case: 
- The objective conduct of the host state inducing legitimate expectations on the 
part of the foreign investor; 
- reliance on that conduct on the part of the foreign investors; 
- frustration of investor’s expectation by subsequent conduct of the host state; 
- unilateralism of conduct of the host state, i.e., absence of meaningful 
communication and/or consent with investors; and 
- damages for the investor. 
C. Detailing the Concept of Legitimate Expectations 
1. Stability and Consistency of the Host State’s Legal Order 
Inconsistent conduct by the host state confuses the investor, stands in the way of 
proper planning, and is not conducive to an investment-friendly climate. Not 
surprisingly, arbitral tribunals have confirmed that inconsistency of conduct by the host 
state, as regards the investor’s obligations, is not compatible with the requirement of 
FET.34  
In MTD v. Chile, the Minister of Economy, Development, and Reconstruction of Chile 
approved the investor’s project in a way which prima facie indicated that the project was 
feasible in the location chosen by the investor.35 Subsequently, however, another agency 
of the host state determined that the zoning regulations stood in the way of the project. 
The Tribunal ruled that such inconsistent conduct violated the FET rule. “What the 
Tribunal emphasizes here is the inconsistency of action between two arms of the same 
Government vis-à-vis the same investor even when the legal framework of the country 
provides for a mechanism to coordinate.”36 
 
34. See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 99 (Aug. 
30, 2000) [hereinafter Metalclad Award], 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002). See generally Tecmed Award, 
supra note 10, ¶ 154; Encana Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3481, Award, ¶ 158 
(Feb. 3, 2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0285_0.pdf; Saluka 
Partial Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 248, 307, 417; PSEG Award, supra note 1, ¶ 248; Biwater Gauff 
(Tanz.) Ltd. v. Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 1602 (July 24, 2008), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0095.pdf; LESI, S.p.A. v. People's 
Dem. Republic of Alg., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Award (Nov. 12, 2008), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0457.pdf; and Lemire Award, supra 
note 31, ¶ 284. 
35. See MTD Award, supra note 12. 
36. MTD Award, supra note 12, ¶ 163. See also Metalclad Award, supra note 34, ¶¶ 97-100 
(attributing liability to the host state from actions of an administrative agency). 
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Another case in point was Eureko v Poland.37 Here, Poland had agreed that Eureko 
would, after the initial investment being the acquisition of the majority of shares of a 
local company, have the right to acquire further shares. Poland subsequently reversed 
course and refused to offer Eureko more shares. Here, as well, the Tribunal found a 
violation of FET.38 
In a broader sense, an alteration of the applicable rules by the host state may also be 
considered from the viewpoint of consistency. In this respect, the requirement of 
consistency overlaps with the need for stability under the FET rule. 
Consistency may not be required under circumstances in which the host state had 
convincing reason to change course. As regards its legislative power, the host state will, 
in principle, have the right to pursue its interests in the light of the new circumstances, 
but not ignore the interests of the investor who had earlier adjusted his conduct to the 
previous course required by the host state. The power to regulate operates within the 
limits of rights conferred upon the investor. Correspondingly, it will have to be assumed 
that the reversing of a position in a dramatic manner with serious negative effects upon 
the investor will be consistent with FET only in the presence of serious exceptional 
reasons, compelling the host state to reverse its previous decision and to require the 
investor to re-adapt its business. 
Beyond administrative consistency, investment tribunals have also ruled that the FET 
standard includes a requirement to maintain a stable legal framework.39 For instance, 
the Tribunal in Occidental v. Ecuador explained, “there is certainly an obligation not to 
alter the legal and business environment in which the investment has been made.”40 
Other cases have addressed the need for consistency and stability of the legal 
framework and the investor’s legitimate expectation. In El Paso v. Argentina, the 
tribunal stated that a host state “should not unreasonably modify the legal framework or 
modify it in contradiction with a specific commitment.”41 This interpretation was also 
adopted by the tribunal in Oostergetel v. Slovak Republic.42 
The Tribunal in LG&E v. Argentina held that FET requires that a host state 
maintains “stability of the legal and business framework” in the state party.43 Similarly, 
Alpha v. Ukraine emphasized the duty of the host state not to arbitrarily change the 
rules to the detriment of the investor.44  
 
37. Eureko Partial Award, supra note 21. 
38. Id. ¶ 234. 
39. Occidental Final Award, supra note 4, ¶ 183. 
40. Id. ¶ 191.  See also Marion Unglaube v. Costa Rica, Award, May 12, 2012, para. 220 et. seq. 
41. El Paso Award, supra note 32, ¶ 364. 
42. Oostergetel Final Award, supra note 11, ¶ 224. 
43. LG&E Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 124. 
44. See Alpha Award, supra note 3, ¶ 420. 
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In a case involving several changes of rules and policies after the making of 
investment, one Tribunal ruled that a “roller-coaster” policy violates the FET rule: 
[T]he Tribunal also finds that the fair and equitable treatment obligation was 
seriously breached by what has been described above as the “roller-coaster” effect of 
the continuing legislative changes. This is particularly the case of the requirements 
relating, in law or practice, to the continuous change in the conditions governing 
the corporate status of the Project, and the constant alternation between private 
law status and administrative concessions that went back and forth. This was also 
the case, to a more limited extent, of the changes in tax legislation.45 
2. Expectations Based on the Host State’s Legal Order 
The appropriate starting point to determine legitimate expectations is the legal order 
of the host state at the time when the investor made its investment. A number of 
investment tribunals have relied on the nexus between legitimate expectations and the 
host state’s legal order at the time of the investment.46 
 
45. PSEG Award, supra note 1, ¶ 250. 
46 . Azinian v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, Award, ¶¶ 95-97 (Nov. 1, 
1999), 14 ICSID Rev. For. Inv. L. J. 535 (1999), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0057.pdf. See also Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. 
U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 156 (Oct. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Mondev Award], 6 
ICSID Rep. 192 (2004), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita1076.pdf; Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, 
Award, ¶ 128 (Dec. 16 2002), 7 ICSID Rep. 341 (2005), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0319.pdf; LG&E Decision, supra note 
26, ¶ 130; Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 262 (May 22, 
2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf [hereinafter Enron 
Award]; BG Group Plc. v. Republic of Arg., Final Award, ¶¶ 297-298 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Dec. 
24, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0081.pdf [hereinafter BG 
Group Final Award]; Duke Energy Electroquil v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, 
Award, ¶¶ 340, 365 (Aug. 18, 2008), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0256.pdf [hereinafter Duke Award]; Jan de Nul N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Award, ¶ 265 (Nov. 6, 2008), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0440.pdf; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of 
Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, ¶¶ 190-191 (Aug. 27, 2009), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0075.pdf; EDF (Services) Ltd. v. Rom., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 219 (Oct. 8, 2009), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0267.pdf; AES Summit Generation 
Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶¶ 9.3.8-9.3.18 (Sept. 23, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0014_0.pdf; Frontier Petroleum Services 
Ltd. v. Czech Republic, Final Award, ¶¶ 287, 468 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 12, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0342.pdf; and National Grid Award, supra 
note 28. Specifically on the relationship with the right to regulate, see PSEG Award, supra note 1, 
¶ 255. (“While noting that no investor ‘may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at 
the time the investment is made remain totally unchanged,’ the Tribunal in Saluka held that the 
investor can still expect that the conduct of the host State subsequent to the investment will be 
fair and equitable as the investor’s decision to invest is based on ‘an assessment of the state of the 
law and the totality of the business environment at the time of the investment.’”). See also Saluka 
Partial Award, supra note 1, ¶ 301. 
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From a broader perspective, to deny the relevance of the legal order of the host state 
in the context of legitimate expectations would assume that stability and predictability of 
the laws of the host state have no bearing upon the object and purpose of an investment 
treaty and the notion of fair and equitable treatment. 
Such assumptions would contravene the spirit in which investments agreements are 
generally concluded. It is well-known that major investments are concluded with a long-
term perspective, often for more than twenty years. The willingness of foreigners to 
invest is linked to the degree of stability in a host state, and stability is one factor for an 
investor to determine the location of its investment. BITs are meant to contribute to 
stability for these very reasons. The FET standard with its focus on legitimate 
expectations appropriately reflects the connection between the flow of investments and 
legal stability. The ECT expressly recognizes an obligation on the part of the host state to 
provide for legal stability.47 
The significance of the laws of the host state for the purpose of determining legitimate 
expectations was addressed in Total v. Argentina,48 an ICSID case, decided in 2010. In a 
split decision, the majority in this case decided that the legal order could not serve as a 
basis for legitimate expectations.49 The majority explained that the legal order would 
have been relevant only in case the relevant laws would have been prospective in nature:  
Indeed, the most difficult case is (as in part in the present dispute) when the basis 
of an investor’s invocation of entitlement to stability under a fair and equitable 
treatment clause relies on legislation or regulation of a unilateral and general 
character. In such instances, investor’s expectations are rooted in regulation of a 
normative and administrative nature that is not specifically addressed to the 
relevant investor. This type of regulation is not shielded from subsequent changes 
under the applicable law. This notwithstanding, a claim to stability can be based on 
the inherently prospective nature of the regulation at issue aimed at providing a 
defined framework for future operations. This is the case for regimes, which are 
applicable to long-term investments and operations, and/or providing for “fall 
backs” or contingent rights in case the relevant framework would be changed in 
unforeseen circumstances or in case certain listed events materialize. In such 
cases, reference to commonly recognized and applied financial and economic 
principles to be followed for the regular operation of investments of that type (be 
they domestic or foreign) may provide a yardstick. This is the case for capital 
intensive and long term investments and operation of utilities under a license, 
natural resources exploration and exploitation, project financing or Build Operate 
and Transfer schemes. The concept of “regulatory fairness” or “regulatory 
certainty” has been used in this respect. In the light of these criteria when a State 
is empowered to fix the tariffs of a public utility it must do so in such a way that 
the concessionaire is able to recover its operations costs, amortize its investments 
 
47. Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95. 
48. Total Decision, supra note 3 
49. Total Decision, supra note 3. 
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and make a reasonable return over time, as indeed Argentina’s gas regime 
provided.50 
Apart from an assessment of the general approach favored by the majority, the Total 
decision on legitimate expectations raises the obvious issue how to define those laws 
which should be considered as ‘prospective’ in nature. What was at stake in the Total 
case was the legal order of the host State regulating tariffs, taxes and an indexation 
scheme set forth in a law. 
In my view, it is difficult to understand why rules on tariffs, taxes and on indexation 
should not be considered as forward-looking or prospective; but then, of course, nearly all 
substantive laws regulating economic affairs seem to fall into that category of laws which 
the Total decision would not classify as prospective. In other words, the principle of the 
relevance of the laws of the host state at the time of the investment, for purposes of 
determining the scope of legitimate expectations, would in effect be largely undermined 
by an exception in case of the lack of a prospective law as postulated by the majority in 
Total. 
The core of the argumentative structure of the ruling in Total stands in direct contrast 
to the widely accepted rule that laws of the host state, at the time of the investment, will 
be central for the determination of legitimate expectations. The Total majority fails to 
provide for a plausible explanation for its view and, therefore, will not be considered to be 
persuasive.  
3. Expectations Based upon Representations 
An important component of legitimate expectations, often invoked, concerns 
representations by the host state upon which the investor has relied. Here, it needs to be 
recognized that unilateral statements are binding, in any event, under customary law if 
they are clear and unequivocal, irrespective of the context of fair and equitable 
treatment.51 The legitimacy of reliance of representation by the host state to the investor 
flows directly from the principle of good faith.   
It may be asked be asked whether representations to the investor will be the only 
factor to determine the range of legitimate expectations. Obviously, it would be a very 
narrow approach to conclude that no other element than representation would be 
relevant in this context. There will be no plausible ground, in terms of the inherent 
purpose and meaning of either FET in general, or legitimate expectations in particular, 
to restrict the sphere of legitimate considerations to representations alone. In particular, 
a narrow view restricting legitimate expectations to representations would be 
 
50. Total Decision, supra note 3, ¶ 122 (emphasis added). 
51. See W. Michael Reisman & Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Question of Unilateral Governmental 
Statements as Applicable Law in Investment Disputes, 19 ICSID Rev. 328 (2004). 
 Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours 
25 
inconsistent with the broadly accepted reference to the state of the law at the time of the 
investment as the primary guideline. Such an approach would also be not compatible 
with the assumption that all circumstances must be taken into account for the 
determination of legitimate expectations.52 
4. Expectations Based upon Contractual Commitments 
Issues concerning legitimate expectations may also arise in the context of contractual 
stability. Total stability for a contract is only guaranteed when the contract is 
guaranteed by an umbrella clause.53 On the other hand, it is also widely accepted that a 
repudiation of a contract by the host state will violate the rights of the investor even in 
the absence of a BIT under the minimum standard of international law.54 It is equally 
recognized that ordinary commercial disputes are not subject to the rules of a BIT in the 
absence of an umbrella clause.55 Within these broader parameters governing contractual 
disputes between a host state and a foreign investor, the legitimate expectations of the 
investor will have to be identified. 
In arbitral practice, the significance of contracts has overlapped with that of the legal 
order in cases in which contractual commitments are anchored in general laws. Recent 
cases with Argentina as the respondent fall into this category; tribunals have been 
inclined in this setting to consider the existence of legitimate expectations in these cases 
without distinguishing the role of laws from those arising out of contracts.56 These 
rulings have properly considered the general legal order and the applicable contracts in 
conjunction and concluded that the investor’s legal expectations were guided by the laws 
and the contracts. 
As to cases dealing specifically with contracts, the decisions in Parkerings v. 
Lithuania,57 and in Hamester v. Ghana,58 questioned whether contractual commitments 
 
52. Electrabel Decision, supra note 22, ¶ 7.78. The Electrabel Decision properly pointed out that while 
specific assurances may reinforce investor’s expectations, such assurance is not always 
indispensable. 
53. On umbrella clauses, see RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 166 (2nd ed. 2012). 
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712 (1987). 
55. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 53, at 152-54. 
56. See e.g., Enron Award, supra note 46, ¶ 43; National Grid Award, supra note 28, ¶¶ 177-178; 
LG&E Decision, supra note 26, ¶ 50; BG Group Final Award, supra note 46, ¶¶ 21-23; and EDF 
Int’l S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award, ¶¶ 999, 1005 (June 11, 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1069.pdf [hereinafter EDF Int’l 
Award]. In EDF Int’l, the Tribunal had to address the failure of the host state to adjust the 
economic equilibrium of a concession after a state of emergency had passed. The Tribunal found a 
violation of “an integral part of fairness and equity.” Id. ¶ 1005.  
57. See Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award (Sept. 11, 
2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0619.pdf [hereinafter 
Parkerings Award]. 
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may serve as the basis for legitimate expectations. In contrast, in Rumeli v. 
Kazakhstan,59 the Tribunal held that the termination of a contract violated the 
claimant’s legitimate expectations. More broadly, Toto v. Lebanon stated that legitimate 
expectations “may follow from explicit or implicit representations by the host state, or 
from its contractual commitments.”60 
From a different angle, and looking at legislative changes affecting contractual 
agreements from a broader perspective, Vivendi II v. Argentina61 suggests that corrective 
measures reversing course should not be adopted unilaterally, but on the basis of 
transparent and non-coercive renegotiations.62 Along the same lines, in 2010, Alpha v. 
Ukraine63 has ruled that a host state should not unilaterally arbitrarily change the rules 
of the game.  
Obviously, the jurisprudence on this point has not yet crystallized in a consistent 
manner. In general, it will be noted that on the scale of different types of commitments 
by the host state, a contractual obligation is closer to a specific representation than to a 
general law. Legitimate expectations will have to be adopted accordingly. 
5. Expectations Based on All Circumstances 
A third aspect often considered in the discussion of legitimate expectations pertains to 
the recognition of all manifestations of FET, being their dependence on context. A 
number of tribunals have repeated that legitimate expectations must be determined in 
the light of all specific circumstances of each case.64   
Often, a close-up view of individual decisions will indeed confirm and emphasize the 
relevance of specific circumstances for the outcome of a case. The ruling in Methanex v 
U.S. (Methanex) is on point with the case concerning legislation in California.65 At first 
sight, this case seems to contradict the position that the adoption of legislation shortly 
after the time of the investment will be difficult to square with the requirement of FET 
and the protection of legitimate expectations. However, the Tribunal clearly pointed to 
 
58. See Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, 
Award (June 18, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0396.pdf. 
59. Rumeli Award, supra note 11, ¶ 615. 
60. Toto Award, supra note 11, ¶ 159 (emphasis added). 
61. Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 7.4.31 (Aug. 20, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0215.pdf. 
62. See also Meg Kinnear, The Continuing Development of the Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Standard, in  INVESTMENT TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES III 207, 225 (Andrea K. Bjorklund et al. 
eds. 2008). 
63. Alpha Award, supra note 3, ¶ 420. 
64. See, e.g., Mondev Award, supra note 46, ¶ 118 and Spyridon Roussalis Award, supra note 11, ¶ 
316. 
65. See Methanex Corp. v. U.S., Final Award of the Trib. on Jurisdiction and Merits (NAFTA Ch. 11 
Arb. Trib. Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf. 
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special circumstances. At the time of the Methanex investments, the substance to be 
produced by Methanex in California was under broad scrutiny, and the legislative change 
that affected Methanex was clearly “on the horizon” at the time of the investment. In 
such a specific setting, absent specific reasons and absent any kind of contractual or 
other commitment, it would indeed be difficult to speak of legitimate expectations on the 
part of the investor. 
6. Circumstances Opposed to Stability 
Another approach was set forth in Duke Energy v. Ecuador (Duke).66 This decision 
recognizes that such expectations of the investor will be protected that are “legitimate 
and reasonable at the time when the investor makes the investment.”67 The special 
element here is that in the view of the Tribunal, all circumstances, including not only the 
facts surrounding the investment, but also the “political, socioeconomic, cultural and 
historical conditions prevailing in the host State” must be taken into account.68 At the 
same time, the Tribunal considered the requirement of a “stable and predictable legal 
framework.”69 
Inasmuch as the Duke decision points to “political, socio-economic, cultural and 
historical conditions” shaping the investor’s legitimate expectations, it is not clear why 
and to what extent these conditions need to be considered. The object and purpose of an 
investment treaty being the promotion and protection of foreign investment, the relevant 
circumstances to be assessed for the determination of legitimate expectations must be of 
a nature that is not inconsistent with that object and purpose. As a consequence, respect 
for a political history of instability or of hostility toward foreign investment, for instance, 
would not be considered to be conducive to the purposes of an investment treaty; indeed, 
such a treaty is concluded to overcome such traditions, and the accepted principles of 
interpretation relevant to an investment agreement will not allow to introduce elements 
of interpretation that stand in contrast to the object and purpose of the treaty. 
7. Legitimate Expectations and the Right to Regulate 
In this context, it is also worthwhile to consider such awards of tribunals which have 
sought to address the particular relationship between the right of the state to regulate 
and the existence of legitimate expectations. Is there an irreconcilable inconsistency 
between the right to regulate and the principle of legitimate expectations? 
 
66. See Duke Award, supra note 46. 
67. Id. ¶ 340. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. ¶ 347. 
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Saluka v. Czech Republic has stated that the host state’s legitimate right 
subsequently, i.e., after the investment in the public interest must be taken into 
consideration as well, and may be cited in this context. 70 
However, the Tribunal’s position is quite nuanced. In a second, following passage, the 
Tribunal calls for “a weighing of the Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations 
on the one hand and the Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on the other.”71 In 
the third passage, the Tribunal considers that a host state must implement its policies 
bona fide by conduct that is, as far as the investor’s investment is concerned, reasonably 
justifiable by public policies. Moreover, the decision adds that the State’s conduct must 
not violate the requirements of “consistency, transparency, even-handedness and non-
discrimination,”72 and also must not disregard “procedural propriety and due process.”73 
Lemire v. Ukraine also speaks of a balance of the right of the investor and of the host 
state, but also goes on to say that regulatory measures must not be unfair and must not 
hinder a level playing field.74 
These considerations by the Saluka and the Lemire Tribunals are multifaceted and 
ultimately seem to point in broad terms to a weighing process whose elements seem to 
escape generalization. Generally speaking, the Tribunals do not answer the question why 
in the context of a BIT, the interests of the state will have the same weight as the 
legitimate expectation of the investor, given the BITs nature and its specific purpose to 
promote and protect the investor’s interest. BITs are drafted in a one-sided manner with 
the aim to provide an investor-friendly climate and to attract foreign investors; absent a 
special treaty clause, a rebalancing of interests in the case of a dispute by a tribunal 
would not be appropriate. 
Another decision addressed the right to regulate and the existence of legitimate 
expectations is Parkerings v. Lithuania, rendered in 2007.75 The case concerned a project 
in Lithuania in the period of transition from communism to the free market. In this 
context, the Tribunal emphasized “each State’s undeniable right and privilege to exercise 
its sovereign legislative power” and also that an investor knows that “laws will evolve 
over time.”76  
However, this Tribunal as well emphasized the limits of that power under a BIT, and 
qualified the right to regulate by adding that a state is prohibited “to act unfairly, 
 
70. Saluka Partial Award, supra note 1, ¶¶ 304-308. 
71. Id. ¶ 306. 
72. Id. ¶ 307. 
73. Id. ¶ 308 (citation omitted). 
74. Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liab., ¶ 267 (Jan. 14, 
2010), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0454.pdf. 
75. See Parkerings Award, supra note 57. 
76. Id. ¶ 332. 
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unreasonably or inequitably in the exercise of its legislative power.”77 Ultimately, 
therefore, the Parkerings’ decision, as well, rests on the conventional position that a state 
has the right to regulate but that it must do so in a fair manner. 
The general issue of the relationship between the FET rule and the right to regulate 
was properly addressed in ADC v. Hungary: 
The Tribunal cannot accept the Respondent’s position that the actions 
taken by it against the Claimants were merely an exercise of its rights 
under international law to regulate its domestic economic and legal 
affairs. It is the Tribunal’s understanding of the basic international law 
principles that while a sovereign State possesses the inherent right to 
regulate its domestic affairs, the exercise of such right is not unlimited 
and must have its boundaries. As rightly pointed out by the Claimants, 
the rule of law, which includes treaty obligations, provides such 
boundaries. Therefore, when a State enters into a bilateral investment 
treaty like the one in this case, it becomes bound by it and the 
investment-protection obligations it undertook therein must be 
honoured rather than be ignored by a later argument of the State’s 
right to regulate.  
The related point made by the Respondent that by investing in a host 
State, the investor assumes the “risk” associated with the State's 
regulatory regime is equally unacceptable to the Tribunal. It is one 
thing to say that an investor shall conduct its business in compliance 
with the host State's domestic laws and regulations. It is quite another 
to imply that the investor must also be ready to accept whatever the 
host State decides to do to it. In the present case, had the Claimants 
ever envisaged the risk of any possible depriving measures, the 
Tribunal believes that they took that risk with the legitimate and 
reasonable expectation that they would receive fair treatment and just 
compensation and not otherwise. 78 
D. Due Process 
Fair procedure is a basic component of the rule of law and a vital element of FET. A 
current expression is found in Article 5 (2)(a) of the U. S. Model BIT 2012: “[FET] 
includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative 
adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the 
principle legal systems of the world . . . .”79 
 
77. Id. 
78. ADC Affiliate Ltd., v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award of the Trib., ¶ 423-
424 (Oct. 2, 2006), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0006.pdf 
[hereinafter ADC Award].  
79. U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 5(2)(a), 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf. 
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Arbitral Tribunals have repeatedly confirmed the significance of fair procedure. For 
instance, in Metalclad v. Mexico, a construction permit had been denied to the claimant.80 
The Tribunal ruled that the failure to hear the investor amounted to a violation of the 
FET standard, stating, “[m]oreover, the permit was denied at a meeting of the Municipal 
Town Council of which Metalclad received no notice, to which it received no invitation, 
and at which it was given no opportunity to appear.”81 
Tecmed v. Mexico also concluded that a failure to notify the claimant in the context of 
a revocation of a license was inconsistent with FET, given that the claimant had no 
opportunity to express its position.82 
In Middle East Cement v. Egypt, the Tribunal found a violation of FET when the host 
state had failed to notify the claimant of an upcoming seizure and auctioning of its ship.83 
Thunderbird v. Mexico agreed that due process is relevant for administrative 
proceedings.84 Genin v. Estonia85 and Waste Management v. Mexico86 confirmed that due 
process and the right to be heard are embodied in FET. 
In ADC v. Hungary, the Tribunal discussed the meaning of due process and concluded, 
in the context of an expropriation clause, that “reasonable advance notice” and a fair 
hearing are required to satisfy the due process standard.87 
For arbitral proceedings, the Annulment Committee in Fraport v. Philippines88 
highlighted the importance of due process, albeit in its own way. 
The above case law indicates that the right to be heard will also be applicable in 
administrative proceedings, even though a right to judicial review may exist with stricter 
procedural guarantees. 
E. Transparency 
So far, issues of transparency in a narrow sense have not often been before tribunals 
in recent years. In the past, a violation of the FET standard was assumed, for instance, 
when the host state failed to clarify the rights of an investor, when the circumstances of 
an act affecting the investor’s rights were obscure, or when a governmental entity refused 
 
80. See Metalclad Award, supra note 34. 
81. Id. ¶ 91. 
82. Tecmed Award, supra note 10, ¶ 162. 
83. Middle East Cement Shipping & Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/99/6, Award, 143 (April 12, 2002), ICSID Rep. 173 (2005), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0531.pdf.  
84. Thunderbird Award, supra note 27, ¶ 197-200. 
85. Genin v. Republic of Est., ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶ 358 (June 25, 2001), 17 ICSID Rev. 
395 (2002), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0359.pdf. 
86. Waste Mgmt. Award, supra note 20, ¶ 98. 
87. ADC Award, supra note 78, ¶ 435. 
88. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of Phil., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/25, Decision on the Application for Annulment, ¶¶ 197-203 (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0341.pdf. 
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to grant a right which had earlier been accorded by another agency of the host state.89 
Also, transparency may, in some settings, be closely linked to require a state to avoid a 
prolonged state of legal uncertainty and ambiguity.90 
F. Freedom from Harassment and Coercion 
Harassment and coercion are forms of conduct not to be expected in the ordinary 
relationship between the host state and the investor. And yet, arbitral practice has had 
to deal with such phenomena. States have come up with various ways of particular 
maltreatment, often disguised in the cloak of lawful investigations, unacceptable options, 
and forced conduct.91 States may be inclined to invoke their power to tax or to protect the 
environment in this context. However, investors must show credible, relevant evidence to 
succeed on a claim of this kind. 
G. Acting for Cause, Arbitrary Treatment 
Tribunals have properly recognized that the fair and equitable treatment does not 
allow arbitrary conduct in the relations between the host state and the investor.92 
Indeed, it would seem difficult to reconcile arbitrary treatment with fair and equitable 
treatment.93 
In an investment-friendly climate, fair and equitable treatment requires that the host 
state does not affect the foreign investor’s rights without cause. Thus, an official may not 
act vis-à-vis an investor because of reasons of a personal nature. On a different level, the 
host state government must not act out of xenophobic motives. More important in 
practice, fair and equitable treatment will stand in the way of conduct of the host state 
that is driven by domestic politics instead of arising out of considerations related to the 
investment. Governmental action will also be suspect in case it is not based on a proper 
review of facts relevant to a decision. Here, the prohibition of arbitrary treatment 
overlaps with the FET rule. 
 
89. See Metalclad Award, supra note 34, ¶ 76; Maffezini Award, supra note 2, ¶ 83; and MTD Award, 
supra note 12, ¶ 163. 
90. See Tecmed Award, supra note 10, ¶ 164, and PSEG Award, supra note 1, ¶ 246. 
91. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 53, 159. 
92. See, e.g., Parkerings Award, supra note 57, ¶ 315, and Pantechniki S.A. v. Albania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/21, Award, ¶ 87 (July 30, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0618.pdf.  
93. In Tecmed, the Tribunal ruled that the arbitrary revocation of a license violates the FET 
standard. See Tecmed Award, supra note 10, ¶ 154. 
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H. Failure to Readjust Equilibrium 
A government taking measures which seriously affects an investor’s interests during 
an economic crisis will violate the FET standard if it fails to readjust the economic 
equilibrium after the crisis has subsided;94 the rules of necessity remain unaffected. 
I. Unilateralism in the Adaptation of Terms 
Unilateralism in the adaptation of the basic terms of an investment, contractual or 
otherwise, and the ensuing dismantling of the legal framework is, in principle, antithetic 
to fair and equitable treatment and to good faith. Depending on the circumstances, 
unilateral acts may violate the FET standard. 
V.  Relationship to Other Principles 
Whereas stability and predictability are more abstract concepts linked to the general 
contours of an investment-friendly climate, the notion of legitimate expectations 
concerns, in a normative-operational mode, the affirmation and the limitations of 
stability and predictability in the light of the particular circumstances of a case. 
Umbrella clauses and stabilization clauses are, in principle, meant to provide for the full 
and unqualified preservation of certain types of obligations during relevant periods.  
VI.  Future Evolution 
How will the FET concept evolve in the coming years? In my view, the standard will 
continue to occupy corporations, investment lawyers, arbitrators and host states alike. 
This will simply be so because a range of grievances of foreign companies do not fall, at 
least not clearly, into the ambit of the more specific categories of protection granted by 
BITs.  
In practice, the types of actions which affect the foreign investor’s interests have 
turned out to be very broad, ranging from tax matters to contractual issues, from tariff 
regulations to the conduct of renegotiation, from open communication among state and 
investor, including to the organization of a bidding process. In all such areas, and 
multiple others, issues of fair treatment may arise, and FET will remain relevant 
because other standards may not be applicable. 
As to the meaning of the standard, tribunals will likely continue to follow the current 
trend and to turn away from broad, subjective assertions and instead apply subcategories 
amenable to objective criteria tied to objective conduct on the part of the host state. This 
approach has the advantage of a plausible objective and higher degree of persuasiveness. 
 
94. See, e.g., EDF Int’l Award, supra note 56. 
 Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours 
33 
The evolving case law has identified, as we have seen, a number of rationally 
manageable subcategories. In practice, these will be suitable to decide the practical 
issues before tribunals in most cases. In other words, the interpretations and application 
of the standard has matured so that subjective views based solely on the arbitrator’s 
notion of fairness will, as a rule, no longer be necessary or appropriate.  
The task of relevant jurisprudence in the future will be to develop and to refine the 
subcategories. 
The topic of legitimate expectations will likely remain in the foreground of the FET 
rule. The further definition of this central topic remains the most important component 
in the development of the FET standard. Fact specific considerations will continue to 
dominate its application, and the law as it stands at the time of the investment will likely 
permeate the circumstances deciding the individual case.  
The ultimate benchmark by which the FET standard and the unfolding relevant 
jurisprudence will be judged is whether the results reached by the tribunals, based on 
the subgroups, are generally considered by the investment community to be just, and 
whether they render justice in a transparent manner, regardless of the more specific 
language and explanation upon which the arbitrators may agree. When it is asked what 
accounts for the extraordinary career of the FET rule in general and of the principle of 
legitimate expectations in particular, the answer must turn to the acceptance of the 
results on the basis of the subgroups. 
The most plausible explanation of the rise of the FET standard will look to this 
question. Was the investor in effect treated in a hospitable climate in a fair manner? It 
appears that in most cases, most arbitrators, and equally important, most commentators, 
have agreed on the answer reached in the specific cases in light of the given 
circumstances. In this way, the usefulness and the operational manageability of the 
standard has generally been confirmed by a broad consensus on the concrete results 
delivered under the auspices of this cardinal rule of foreign investment law. 
 
  
